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Set-theoretic Foundations1 
 
 
 It’s more or less standard orthodoxy these days that set theory -
- ZFC, extended by large cardinals -- provides a foundation for 
classical mathematics.  Oddly enough, it’s less clear what ‘providing 
a foundation’ comes to.  Still, there are those who argue strenuously 
that category theory would do this job better than set theory does, or 
even that set theory can’t do it at all, and that category theory can.  
There are also those insist that set theory should be understood, not 
as the study of a single universe, V, purportedly described by ZFC + 
LCs, but as the study of a so-called ‘multiverse’ of set-theoretic 
universes -- while retaining its foundational role.  I won’t pretend 
to sort out all these complex and contentious matters, but I do hope 
to compile a few relevant observations that might help bring 
illumination somewhat closer to hand. 
 
                       
1  It’s an honor to be included in this 60th birthday tribute to Hugh Woodin, 
who’s done so much to further, and often enough to re-orient, research on the 
fundamentals of contemporary set theory.  I’m grateful to the organizers for 
this opportunity, and especially, to Professor Woodin for his many 
contributions.   
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I.  Foundational uses of set theory 
 
The most common characterization of set theory’s foundational 
role, the characterization found in textbooks, is illustrated in the 
opening sentences of Kunen’s classic book on forcing:   
Set theory is the foundation of mathematics.  All mathematical 
concepts are defined in terms of the primitive notions of set and 
membership.  In axiomatic set theory we formulate … axioms about 
these primitive notions …  From such axioms, all known 
mathematics may be derived.  (Kunen [1980], p. xi) 
 
These days, familiarity has dulled our sense of just how astounding 
this fact really is.  In his introductory text, Enderton makes sure 
that his students appreciate its scope and power: 
It is sometimes said that ‘mathematics can be embedded in set 
theory’.  This means that mathematical objects (such as numbers 
and differentiable functions) can be defined to be certain sets.  
And the theorems of mathematics (such as the fundamental theorem 
of calculus) then can be viewed as statements about sets.  
Furthermore, these theorems will be provable from our axioms.  
Hence our axioms provide a sufficient collection of assumptions 
for the development of the whole of mathematics -- a remarkable 
fact.  (Enderton [1977], pp. 10-11) 
 
The question for us is:  what’s the point of this exercise?  What 
goal, properly thought of as ‘foundational’, is served by this 
‘embedding’? 
 A glance at the history delivers a hint.  At the turn of the last 
century, Hilbert had just proved the consistency of geometry by 
relying on analysis, so he set the task of proving the consistency of 
analysis as the second on his famous list of problems in [1900].  In 
earlier correspondence with Cantor, Hilbert had come to understand 
that there could be no set of all alephs, and to feel the need for a 
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consistent axiomatization of set theory, as well.2  Zermelo arrived in 
Göttingen in 1897: 
When I was a Privatdozent in Göttingen, I began, under the 
influence of D. Hilbert, to whom I owe more than to anybody else 
with regard to my scientific development, to occupy myself with 
questions concerning the foundations of mathematics, especially 
with the basic problems of Cantorian set theory.  (Quoted in 
Ebbinghaus [2007], p. 28) 
 
By 1908, in his famous axiomatization, Zermelo drew the explicit 
connection between set theory and analysis:3 
Set theory is that branch of mathematics whose task is to 
investigate mathematically the fundamental notions ‘number’, 
‘order’, and ‘function’, taking them in their pristine, simple 
form, and to develop thereby the logical foundations of all of 
arithmetic and analysis.  (Zermelo [1908], p. 200) 
 
Subsequent developments extended set theory’s reach to the whole of 
classical mathematics, as indicated in the quotations from Kunen and 
Enderton. 
 Suppose, then, that your goal is to prove something or other 
about the vast variety of classical mathematics -- for the Hilbert 
school, its consistency.  To do this, you first need to corral it all 
into some manageable package, and set theory turned out to be up to 
that task.  Of course Gödel saw to it, with his second incompleteness 
theorem, that the project didn’t turn out as Hilbert and his followers 
had hoped, but the fact remains that the most sweeping moral of 
Gödel’s work -- that classical mathematics (if consistent) can’t prove 
                       
2  See Ebbinghaus [2007], pp. 42-43. 
3  Ebbinghaus ([2007], pp. 76-79), highlights the role of Hilbert’s program 
among the motivations for Zermelo’s axiomatization.  Apparently Zermelo was 
keen to include a consistency proof in his [1908], but Hilbert encouraged him 
to publish it as it stood, in part, Ebbinghaus reports, because Hilbert knew 
‘that Zermelo needed publications to promote his career’ (p. 78).   
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its own consistency -- is only possible given the set theory’s 
codification of the entire subject into a neat set of simple axioms.  
And subsequently, the set-theoretic codification made it possible to 
settle other important questions of provability and unprovability, 
sparing the profession from sadly doomed efforts.  So the ‘embedding’ 
of mathematics in set theory has this clear use.  Presumably we’d all 
agree that the goal of proving something general about classical 
mathematics counts as ‘foundational’ in some sense, so here we do find 
set theory playing a foundational role.   
 Of course, this Meta-mathematical Corral is hardly the only 
foundational role set theory has been thought to play, but I think two 
of these can be dismissed as spurious.  The first sees the ‘embedding’ 
of classical mathematics in set theory, often called a ‘reduction’ of 
classical mathematics to set theory, as the immediate descendant of 
Frege’s Logicism.  This line of thought takes Frege’s project to be 
roughly epistemological:  if mathematics can be reduced to logic, then 
knowing a mathematical fact is reduced to knowing a logical fact; 
assuming that we have an account of logical knowledge, or at least 
that finding such an account is a less daunting prospect than finding 
an account of mathematical knowledge had previously appeared to be, 
this reduction is a clear epistemological gain.4   Of course Frege’s 
logic turned out to be inconsistent and set theory has taken its 
place, but the epistemological analysis is supposed to carry over:  we 
                       
4  It isn’t obvious that Frege himself saw the matter quite this way:  much of 
his interest is in objective grounding relations between propositions, which 
are independent of our human ways of finding things out.  See, e.g., Burge 
[1998]. 
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know the theorems of mathematics because we know the axioms of set 
theory and prove those theorems from them.  Thus the problem of 
mathematical knowledge reduces to the problem of knowing the set-
theoretic axioms. 
 The trouble with this picture is that it’s obviously false:  our 
greatest mathematicians know (and knew!) many theorems without 
deriving them from the axioms.  The observation that our knowledge of 
mathematics doesn’t flow from the fundamental axioms to the theorems 
goes back at least to Russell -- who emphasized that the logical order 
isn’t the same as the epistemological order, that the axioms might 
gain support from the familiar theorems they generate, not vice versa5 
-- and is prominent in Zermelo -- who defended the Axiom of Choice on 
the basis of its consequences.6  As is often noted, a well-known fact 
of arithmetic or analysis or geometry may be considerably more certain 
than the axioms of set theory from which it derived.  For that matter, 
to make a Wittgensteinian point,7 in most cases we only believe that 
there is a proof of a certain mathematical theorem from ZFC because we 
believe the theorem on the basis of its ordinary proof and we believe 
that all theorems of mathematics are ultimately provable from ZFC!  So 
this purported foundational use of set theory, as the Epistemic Source 
of all mathematical knowledge, is a failure.  But this casts no doubt 
on the Meta-mathematical Corral. 
                       
5  See Russell [1907].   
 
6  See Zermelo [1908a]. 
7  Wittgenstein ([1978], Part III) is thinking of the relations between 
ordinary decimal calculations and the corresponding inferences in, say, the 
notation of Principia Mathematica, but the upshot is the same. 
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 The other purported foundational role for set theory that seems 
to me spurious is what might be called the Metaphysical Insight.  The 
thought here is that the set-theoretic reduction of a given 
mathematical object to a given set actually reveals the true 
metaphysical identity that object enjoyed all along.  Benacerraf 
famously argued that this can’t be right, because, for example, 
Zermelo took the natural numbers to be ø, {ø}, {{ø}}, … , von Neumann 
took them to be ø, {ø}, {ø, {ø}}, … , and there’s no principled reason 
to choose one over the other.8  There are practical reasons to prefer 
the von Neumann ordinals -- they generalize easily to the transfinite, 
for example -- but this sort of thing isn’t an indicator of ‘what the 
numbers really are’.  Or so the argument goes.   
Of course the practice of set theory is filled with even more 
arbitrary choices, like the conventional preference for the Kuratowski 
ordered pair.  It’s worth noticing that Kunen speaks of ‘defining 
mathematical concepts’, not identifying mathematical objects, and 
Enderton, who does refer to ‘mathematical objects’, only speaks of how 
they ‘can be defined’ and how theorems about them ‘can be viewed’.  In 
yet another textbook, Moschovakis makes the thought behind this 
circumspection explicit:  
A typical example of the method we will adopt is the 
‘identification’ of [the geometric line] with the set … of real 
numbers.  …  What is the precise meaning of this 
‘identification’?  Certainly not that points are real numbers.  …  
What we mean by the ‘identification’ of [the line] with [the 
reals] is that the correspondence … gives a faithful 
representation … which allows us to give arithmetic definitions 
for all the useful geometric notions and to study the 
mathematical properties of [the line] as if points were real 
                       
8  See Benacerraf [1965]. 
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numbers.  … In the same way, we will discover within the universe 
of sets faithful representations of all the mathematical objects 
we need, and we will study set theory …[9] as if all mathematical 
objects were sets.  (Moschovakis [1994], pp. 33-34, emphasis in 
the original) 
 
The trick, in each case, is to identify the conditions that a 
‘faithful representation’ must satisfy.  For the case of ordered 
pairs, this is easy:  two of them should be equal iff their first 
elements are equal and their second elements are equal.  The case of 
the natural numbers is more demanding:  a set of sets with its 
operations should satisfy the (full second-order) Peano Postulates.  
For our purposes, the simple point is that these set-theoretic 
reductions don’t give any sort of deep metaphysical information about 
the nature of the line or of ordered pairs or of natural numbers, nor 
are they so intended.  Metaphysical Insight, like Epistemic Source, is 
spurious, leaving only Meta-mathematical Corral.   
  But this is hardly the end of the story.  The impressive 
mathematical innovations present in the earliest invocations of sets -
- Cantor’s in his work on trigonometric series and Dedekind’s on 
ideals in the early 1870s -- aren’t actually foundational in 
character, but around the same time, Dedekind also undertook a project 
that was explicitly foundational:  to ‘find a purely arithmetical and 
perfectly rigorous foundation for the principles of infinitesimal 
calculus’ (Dedekind [1872], p. 767).  Charged to teach the subject, 
Dedekind laments ‘the lack of a truly scientific foundation’, finds 
himself forced to take ‘refuge in geometric evidence’ which ‘can make 
                       
9  In the ellipsis, Moschovakis writes, ‘on the basis of the lean axiom system 
of Zermelo’, perhaps gesturing toward the Meta-mathematical Corral. 
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no claim to being scientific’ (ibid.).  Comparing the line with the 
rational numbers, we see in the rationals ‘a gappiness, 
incompleteness, discontinuity’ and in the line an ‘absence of gaps, 
completeness, continuity’, so the key question emerges: 
In what then does this continuity consist?  Everything must 
depend on the answer to this question, and only through it shall 
we obtain a scientific basis for the investigation of all 
continuous domains.  (Dedekind [1872], p. 771) 
 
The then-current understanding rested only on those geometric 
intuitions, and on  
vague remarks upon the unbroken connection in the smallest parts 
[by which] obviously nothing is gained.  (Ibid.) 
 
So, the challenge was to replace these unscientific vagaries with  
a precise characteristic of continuity that can serve as the 
basis for valid deductions.  (Ibid.) 
 
And this, of course, is what Dedekind goes on to provide, in his 
theory of cuts in the rationals -- using set-theoretic machinery. 
 At first glance, this may look like just one more instance of the 
set-theoretic reduction that underlies the Meta-mathematical Corral, 
but in fact there’s something more going on.  It isn’t that we have an 
explicit mathematical item -- the ordered pair, or the numbers as 
described by Peano -- which we then ‘identify’ with a set that can 
play the same role, do the same jobs.  Instead, in this case, we have 
a vague picture of continuity that’s served us well enough in many 
respects, well enough to generate and develop the calculus, but now 
isn’t precise enough to do what it’s being called upon to do:  allow 
for rigorous proofs of the fundamental theorems.  For that we need 
something more exact, more precise, which Dedekind supplies.  This 
isn’t just a set-theoretic surrogate, designed to reflect the features 
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of the pre-theoretic item; it’s a set-theoretic improvement, a set-
theoretic replacement of an imprecise notion with a precise one.  So 
here’s another foundational use of set theory:  Elucidation.  The 
replacement of the imprecise notion of function with the set-theoretic 
version is another well-known example.10 
 To isolate another productive foundational use of set theory, we 
need to trace some of the profound shifts in the theory and practice 
of mathematics that took place over the course of the 19th century, 
starting with geometry.  Since the ancients, geometry had been closely 
associated with ordinary diagrams, and late in the 1700s, Kant 
developed his elaborate theory of spatiotemporal intuition to 
undergird this approach.  This comforting view of the matter was 
challenged early in the 19th century, as it became clear how much there 
was to be gained by viewing ordinary geometry from the richer, 
projective point of view -- with its ‘imaginary points’ (points with 
complex numbers as coordinates) and ‘points at infinity’ (points where 
parallel lines meet).  Of course these new points can’t be pictured, 
so the work was roundly resisted at first on the grounds that ‘it 
keeps itself too much aloof from all intuition, which is the essential 
trait of mathematical knowledge’.11  The very notion of invisible, 
unvisualizable ‘points’ where two disjoint circles or two parallel 
lines in fact ‘intersect’ was not only contrary to the intuitive 
ground of geometry, but to plain common sense.  Still, as Nagel 
                       
10  For a quick overview of the history, see [1997], pp. 118-126. 
11  The remark comes from Möbius, he of the strip.  Quoted in Nagel [1979], p. 
219.   
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remarks in his historical survey, on the closely related subject of 
negative and complex numbers: 
Scandal or not, there were few mathematicians who did not 
recognize their value or whose logical consciences were so tender 
than they would not use them.  (Nagel [1979], p. 202) 
 
The same could be said of the new projective geometry. 
 
I bring up this episode because the ‘scandal’ was resolved in 
mid-century by von Staudt, using proto-set-theoretic techniques, in 
particular a precursor of the method of equivalence classes:  for 
example, the point at infinity where two horizontal lines meet is 
identified with what we’d now see as the set of lines parallel to 
these two, and a given point at infinity is on a particular line if 
that line is in the set with which that point at infinity has been 
identified.  In this and related ways, von Staudt managed to build 
surrogates for heretofore suspicious, possibly dangerous new items 
(like points at infinity) out of uncontroversial, unproblematic 
materials (ordinary lines), and to redefine the relevant relations so 
as to validate the existing, successful theory.  His goal in all this 
is to remove any queasiness we might have about the legitimacy or 
coherence of the new, un-intuited items.   
As time went by, it became clear that the construction tools 
needed for this ‘building’ process -- tools von Staudt regarded as 
‘logical’ -- were actually set-theoretic in character.  Speaking of 
the operations codified in Zermelo’s axioms, Burgess writes: 
A crucial fact … is that these are essentially the existence 
assumptions needed to get new spaces or number systems or 
whatever from old ones … in the manner of nineteenth-century 
introduction of auxiliaries for the study of traditional spaces 
or number systems.  Indeed, the constructions of the auxiliaries 
in question can be, and now in retrospect are, viewed as 
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essentially ‘set-theoretic’ constructions, though some of them 
actually antedate Cantor.  (Burgess [2015], p. 76, emphasis in 
the original) 
 
This striking fact -- that the methods of von Staudt and others all 
fall within the few closure principles used by the early set theorists 
and codified by Zermelo -- this fact is what eventually made possible 
what we now know as the set-theoretic reduction of classical 
mathematics.  
 But the story of queasiness-removal doesn’t end there.  In the 
late 1800s, pure mathematics was on the rise, and with it, the 
axiomatic method; in place of von Staudt-like constructions, new 
fields were introduced instead by an explicit set of axioms.  In his 
comprehensive history, Kline describes the situation this way: 
Mathematics, from a logical standpoint, was by the end of the 
nineteenth century a collection of structures each built on its 
own system of axioms.  … As long as mathematics was regarded as 
the truth about nature, the possibility of contradictory theorems  
… would have been regarded as absurd.  (Kline [1972], p. 1038) 
 
-- but without that worldly backing, the question of which of these 
axiom systems could be trusted became acute.  This new queasiness 
could best be removed by a proof of consistency, and set theory again 
presented itself, now as the source for such proofs.  We return in a 
moment to the difference between von Staudt-like surrogates and 
axiomatic consistency proofs -- roughly, between proving from ZFC that 
there’s a structure of a certain sort, and proving from ZFC that 
there’s a model that thinks there’s a structure of a certain sort -- 
but for now what’s important is that neither of these effectively 
removes queasiness unless ZFC itself is known to be trustworthy.   
Zermelo felt the force of these considerations, remarking that 
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I have not yet … been able to prove rigorously that my axioms are 
consistent, though this is certainly very essential; instead I 
have had to confine myself to pointing out now and then that the 
antinomies discovered so far vanish one and all if the principles 
here proposed are adopted as a basis.  But I hope to have done at 
least some useful spadework hereby for subsequent investigations 
of such deeper problems.  (Zermelo [1908], pp. 200-201) 
 
We now smile, perhaps a bit wistfully, at this optimism.12  In the 
decades since Gödel dashed these fond hopes, the hierarchy of large 
cardinals has arisen as a measure of consistency strength, and the 
early foundational goal of conclusive queasiness-removal has given way 
to a more nuanced matter of Risk Assessment.  So, for example, in the 
abstract for a recent ASL talk, Voevodsky speaks of the role of set 
theory in his program of ‘univalent foundations’:13 
Univalent foundations provide a new approach to the formal 
reasoning about mathematical objects.  The languages which arise 
in this approach are much more convenient for doing serious 
mathematics than ZFC at the cost of being much more complex.  In 
particular, the consistency issues for these languages are not 
intuitively clear.  Thus ZFC retains its key role as the theory 
which is used [to] ensure that the more and more complex 
languages of the univalent approach are consistent.  (Voevodsky 
[2014], p. 108) 
 
Or as he puts it, more carefully, in the slides for this talk:   
Set theory will remain the most important benchmark of 
consistency.  … each new addition to the … language will require 
formal ‘certification’ by showing, through formally constructed 
interpretation, that it is at least as consistent as ZFC.  
(Voevodsky [2013], slide 21) 
 
Obviously this generalizes to ‘at least as consistent as ZFC + one or 
another large cardinal’. 
                       
12  Recall footnote 3, above. 
 
13  For the foundational role ‘univalent foundations’ might itself be intended 
to play, see footnote 38. 
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 Notice that Risk Assessment in either form isn’t the same as 
Meta-mathematical Corral:  the point isn’t to round up all classical 
mathematical items into one simple package, so as to prove something 
about all of it all at once, but to assess a particular new, somehow 
dangerous or suspicious item to determine just how risky it is.  And 
it differs from Elucidation as well:  von Staudt had before him a 
perfectly functional geometric practice with ideal points; his task 
wasn’t to make that practice more precise, and thus more functional, 
but to reproduce it chapter-and-verse in a way that was less 
worrisome; conversely, Dedekind’s concern wasn’t that the real numbers 
were somehow worrisome, but that they weren’t sufficiently precise to 
support the practice, weren’t sufficiently functional.  So we have at 
this point these three distinct foundational uses for set theory, 
along with a pair of spurious ones -- Metaphysical Insight, and 
Epistemic Source. 
There remains one more, quite familiar line of foundational 
thought, namely the idea that set theory provides decisive answers to 
questions of ontology14 and proof:  if you want to know whether or not 
a so-and-so exists, see whether one can be found in V; if you want to 
know whether or not such-and-such is provable, see whether it can be 
derived from the axioms of set theory.  (In fact, both of these are 
provability conditions:  a so-and-so ‘can be found in V’ iff the 
                       
14  This term isn’t intended in any philosophically loaded way:  I just mean 
what the practice asserts to exist, leaving the semantic or metaphysical 
issues open.  Mac Lane ([1981], p. 468) and Feferman ([1977], p. 151) both 
see set theory as inseparable from a kind of Platonistic metaphysics, but 
I’ve argued that employing a rich set-theoretic ontology is consistent with 
being an Arealist (as in [2011]).  
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existence of a so-and-so can be proved from the axioms.)  This is 
sometimes expressed with the rhetorical flourish that set theory is 
the ‘final court of appeal’ on matters of proof and ontology.  I 
should confess that I’ve indulged in this flourish myself ([1997], p. 
26), making it sound as if classical mathematics must bow to the 
dictates of set theory, but in practice I’ve taken this foundational 
role to place methodological constraints on set theory, the founding 
theory, not on classical mathematics, the theory to be founded.  In 
particular, I argued that set theory, if it was to play this role, 
should be as generous as possible -- so as not to curtail pure 
mathematics -- and should be given by one unified theory that’s as 
decisive as possible -- so as to provide unequivocal answers to 
questions of ontology and proof.15   
Fearing, then, that the ‘final court of appeal’ is something of 
an exaggeration, let’s look a bit more closely to discern what 
foundational uses are actually in play.  At the very least, there’s 
the plain sociological fact that derivation from ZFC is generally 
regarded as standard of proof in mathematics:  in practice, the 
availability of the axioms of ZFC goes without saying; if stronger 
assumptions are in play, this is explicitly acknowledged;16 if only 
weaker assumptions are needed, this is noted to give a more nuanced 
picture of the dependencies involved.  Burgess observes: 
                       
15  These are the methodological maxims MAXIMIZE and UNIFY from [1997]. 
 
16  Burgess ([2015], p. 177, footnote 11) notes an exception:  proofs 
appealing to Grothendieck’s work sometimes omit what comes to an appeal to 
inaccessibles.  See §II below. 
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There are … no official censors preventing a group of dissidents 
from founding a journal of their own, in which as a matter of 
editorial policy results must be proved according to the group’s 
restrictive standards (or as the case may be, results may be 
proved making use of the group’s preferred additional 
hypotheses), rather than presented as they would be in a journal 
enforcing the orthodox standard … No one dissident school of 
thought, however, produces work of sufficient volume at a 
sufficient pace to keep a journal of high standards following 
such a policy coming out regularly.  (Burgess [2015], p. 118) 
 
In this foundational role, then, formal derivation in set theory 
serves as a Shared Standard of what counts as a proof.  
But what lies behind this sociological fact?  Partly there’s the 
recognition that formal derivation turns out to be a good mathematical 
model for the scope of human proving activity, but why from these 
particular axioms?  To shed light on this question, recall the 
‘ontological’ component of the ‘final court of appeal’:  there is a 
so-and-so if one can be found in V, if the existence of a so-and-so 
can be proved from the axioms.  A few pages back, in connection with 
Risk Assessment, we noted a contrast between queasiness-removal by 
outright existence proof and queasiness-removal by consistency proof.  
Now we find the purported standard of existence apparently promoting 
von-Staudt-like construction over the more lenient Hilbert-like idea 
that consistency of the appropriate set of axioms is enough.  To 
illustrate with an example, suppose a mathematician wants to know:  is 
there a definable (projective) well-ordering of the reals?  In ZFC 
alone, the question can’t be answered, but assuming, as many set 
theorists do, that ZFC + LCs is the appropriate measure, the answer is 
no.  Still, the opposite answer can be had in L.  In light of that 
fact, would we really want to shut the door on this mathematician?  
For that matter, why shouldn’t we follow Hilbert and open that door to 
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the existence claims of any consistent set of axioms?  Why does ‘final 
court’ insist that we restrict ourselves to exactly what happens in V?   
The source of this more stringent ‘final court’ criterion is 
simple:  the branches of modern mathematics are intricately and 
productively intertwined, from coordinate geometry, to analytic number 
theory, to algebraic geometry, to topology, to modern descriptive set 
theory (a confluence of point-set topology and recursion theory), to 
the kind of far-flung interconnections recently revealed in the proof 
of Fermat’s Last Theorem.  What’s needed is a single arena where all 
the various structures studied in all the various branches can co-
exist side-by-side, where their interrelations can be studied, shared 
fundamentals isolated and exploited, effective methods exported and 
imported from one to another, and so on.  Burgess puts the point 
forcefully: 
Interconnectedness implies that it will no longer be sufficient 
to put each individual branch of mathematics separately on a 
rigorous basis … To guarantee that rigor is not compromised in 
the process of transferring material from one branch of 
mathematics to another, it is essential that the starting points 
of the branches being connected should … be compatible.  … The 
only obvious way to ensure compatibility of the starting points … 
is ultimately to derive all branches from a common, unified 
starting point.  (Burgess [2015], pp. 60-62) 
 
Set theory’s universe, V, provides the Generous Arena in which all 
this takes place, and that’s why the ‘final court’ condition takes the 
form it does:  to be a full participant in mathematical interaction, a 
so-and-so must appear along-side the full range of its fellows, with 
all the tools of construction and interaction fully available.17 
                       
17  Of course Shared Standard and Generous Arena depend on the same facts of 
set-theoretic reduction as Meta-mathematical Corral:  that formal proof is a 
good model of provability by humans  and that the axioms of set theory codify 
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 Viewed in this light, our flat answer to the mathematician’s 
question deserves a bit of shading.  A definable well-ordering of the 
reals occurs in L, a well-understood structure where all the axioms of 
ZFC are satisfied.  This means that L itself is a fairly generous 
arena:  all the usual constructions of ZFC are available; all the 
standard theorems from all the familiar branches of the subject are in 
place; so serious mathematical work can be carried out in the presence 
of a definable well-ordering.  The drawback is that care has to be 
taken with export and import.  But the pure Hilbert-style case is 
different:  proving that there is a model for a set of axioms that 
implies the existence of a so-and-so can provide Risk Assessment, but 
it doesn’t by itself install a so-and-so in the Generous Arena where 
classical mathematics takes place.   
 Stripped of its pretensions, then, the ‘final court’ condition 
comes down to this:  a Shared Standard of proof designed to generate a 
Generous Arena for the pursuit and flourishing of pure mathematics.  
From this point of view, the requirement that assumptions beyond ZFC 
be noted explicitly makes perfect sense:  our mathematician is welcome 
to work with his definable well-ordering in L as long as he recognizes 
that his conclusions can’t be freely exported to the more standard 
arena with ZFC alone, and that work predicated on the popular 
assumption of large cardinals can’t be imported.  On the plus side, he 
                                                                        
the fundamental assumptions of classical mathematics.  What separates them 
are the uses to which these facts are being put:  in Meta-mathematical 
Corral, ‘derivable in ZFC’ functions as model for ‘provable in classical 
mathematics’; in Shared Standard, it’s used as a benchmark for what counts as 
a legitimate informal proof; in Generous Arena, V brings all the objects and 
methods of classical mathematics together for fruitful interaction.  As 
foundational uses, these are distinct.    
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gains all the benefits of our existing understanding of the details of 
life in L, and his work can be understood as further illuminating what 
goes on there.  Work in ZFC + V=L has obvious value, but of course 
some extensions of ZFC are be more mathematically rewarding than 
others!18  
 In sum, then, we’ve collected an array of important uses of set 
theory that ought to qualify as ‘foundational’ -- Meta-mathematical 
Corral, Elucidation, Risk Assessment, Shared Standard and Generous 
Arena -- as well as a pair that are spurious -- Metaphysical Insight 
and Epistemic Source.  The famed set-theoretic reduction of classical 
mathematics lies in the background for most of this, fruitful and 
spurious alike.  Details aside, we see that the remarkable fact of the 
reduction doesn’t, by itself, dictate any particular foundational use.  
For this reason, it seems to me counter-productive to begin from the 
question:  does a given theory provide a foundation for classical 
mathematics?  Rather, we should be asking:  what foundational purposes 
does the given theory serve, and how?  With this in mind, let’s turn 
to set theory’s famous rival.  
 
II.  Foundational uses of category theory 
 Category theory was introduced in the 1940s, by which time the 
notion of set-theoretic foundations had become mainstream orthodoxy.  
Like Cantor’s initial appeals to sets, Eilenberg and Mac Lane’s 
categories emerged in the pursuit of straightforwardly mathematical 
                       
18  For some purposes, it’s useful to consider arenas not quite as generous as 
full ZFC, e.g., L(R), where Choice is false, but all sets of reals are 
Lebesgue measurable. 
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goals.  Foundational concerns first came into the picture in the form 
of criticisms of set theory’s foundational aspirations.  Mac Lane 
grants the effectiveness to date of set-theoretic foundations: 
The prior situation in the foundations of Mathematics had in one 
respect a very simple structure.  One could produce one formal 
system, say Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, with the property that 
all ordinary operations of practising Mathematicians could be 
carried out within this one system and on objects of this system. 
… ‘every’ Mathematical object was or could be defined to be a 
set, and … all of the arguments about these objects could be 
reduced to the axioms of ZF set theory. …  This one-formal-system 
‘monolithic’ approach has … been convenient for specialists on 
foundations ever since Frege and Whitehead-Russell.  On the one 
hand, all the classical nineteenth century problems of 
foundations (the construction of integers, real numbers, analysis 
… ) could be stated in this one system.  On the other hand, 
alternative formal system[s] could … be tested by comparison (as 
to strength or relative consistency) with this one system. (Mac 
Lane [1971], pp. 235-236) 
 
Here we find gestures toward Generous Arena, Risk Assessment, 
Elucidation (for the case of the reals)19, Meta-mathematical Corral (in 
the usefulness to ‘specialists in foundations’) and Shared Standard20.  
Mac Lane’s only complaint is that ‘this happy situation no longer 
applies to the practice of category theory’ (Mac Lane [1971], p. 236).    
 What is it about category theory that purportedly ends the reign 
of set-theoretic foundations?   
Categorical algebra has developed in recent years as an effective 
method of organizing parts of mathematics.  Typically, this sort 
of organization uses notions such as that of the category G of 
all groups.  This category consists of two collections:  The 
collection of all groups G and the collection of all 
                       
19  Cf. Mac Lane [1986], p. 362:  ‘this approach to Mathematics has the 
advantage that every concept can be made absolutely clear and explicit’. 
 
20  Cf. Mac Lane [1986], p. 377:  ‘we have now stated an absolute standard of 
rigor:  A Mathematical proof is rigorous when it is (or could be) written out 
in the first order predicate language [with membership as the only non-
logical symbol] as a sequence of inferences from the axioms ZFC, each 
inference made according to one of the stated rules’. 
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homomorphisms … of one group G into another one; the basic 
operation in this category is the composition of two such 
homomorphisms.  To realize the intent of this construction it is 
vital that this collection G contain all groups; however, if 
‘collection’ is to mean ‘set’ … this intent cannot be directly 
realized.  (Mac Lane [1971], p. 231) 
 
Because there is no set of all groups, set theory can’t properly found 
category theory.21  So the argument goes. 
 To overcome this problem, Grothendieck devised a system of 
‘universes’ essentially equivalent to Zermelo’s hierarchy of Vκ’s for κ 
inaccessible,22 and all parties agree that surrogates for any actual 
use of category theory can be found within some Vκ.23 Burgess writes: 
For applications … one doesn’t need a category of literally all 
groups …  It is always enough to have a category of ‘enough’ 
groups, though how many is enough may vary from application to 
application.  … Grothendieck’s hypothesis is that every set, 
however large, belongs to some local universe [that is, some Vκ]:  
The ‘global universe’ … is simply the union of increasingly large 
local universes.  (Burgess [2015], p. 174) 
 
Why doesn’t this settle the matter?  Assuming that Risk Assessment is 
the foundational use of set theory in question here, as Mac Lane 
sometimes suggests,24 then we have our answer:  category theory is no 
                       
21  A move to NGB would introduce the category of all groups as a proper 
class, but it would still leave out important functor categories.  See 
MacLane [1971]. 
 
22  See Zermelo [1930]. 
 
23  See, e.g., Feferman [1977], p. 155.  Grothendieck’s accomplishment here 
runs parallel to von Staudt’s:  show that the job of a worrisome item (point 
at infinity, category of all groups) can be carried out with an 
uncontroversial item (a set of lines, a set of ‘enough’ groups).   
 
24  See Mac Lane [1986], p. 406:  ‘in one sense a foundation is a security 
blanket:  If you meticulously follow the rules laid down, no paradoxes or 
contradictions will arise’.  He goes on to point out that a risk of zero 
can’t be achieved in this way, but the quotation in the text from Mac Lane 
[1971], p. 237, explicitly recognizes the worth of Risk Assessment:  
‘alternative formals system[s] could … be tested by comparison (as to 
strength or relative consistency) with this one system.’ 
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worse off than ‘ZFC + many Inaccessibles’, which doesn’t take us far 
beyond ZFC itself.25  With this mild extension of ZFC, Meta-
mathematical Corral would also be achieved, nor is there any obvious 
difficulty for any of the other foundational uses of set theory.  
 But Mac Lane knows all this and clearly isn’t satisfied: 
Given any universe U’, one can always form the category of all 
categories within U’.  This is still not that will-of-the-wisp, 
the category of all categories überhaupt.  (Mac Lane [1971], p. 
234) 
 
What exactly is the imagined deficit?  For any particular use of the 
category of ‘all’ groups or the category of ‘all’ categories, there’s 
a set-theoretic surrogate that does the job.  The objection here 
appears to be that the surrogate isn’t the real thing.  But why should 
it be?  In this form, the objection begins to sound analogous to the 
complaint, in Benacerraf’s context, that the von Neumann ordinals 
aren’t acceptable set-theoretic surrogates for the natural numbers 
because the actual 2 isn’t an element of the actual 3!  In other 
words, Mac Lane appears to be drifting into the demand that a 
foundation provide Metaphysical Insight -- a demand that set theory 
never properly took on in the first place. 
 However that may be, the problem of ‘founding’ unlimited 
categories was taken up by Feferman in the late 1960s and revisited 
                       
25  In fact, Burgess ([2015], p. 176) points out that the inaccessibles aren’t 
strictly necessary, that they can be removed by careful use of reflection.  
But, he observes, ‘in Grothendieck’s kind of work the intellectual faculties 
are being strained to their uttermost limit, and one doesn’t want the 
distraction of any sort of bookkeeping requirements’. 
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most recently in his [2013].26  Feferman explicitly identifies the 
issue as one of Risk Assessment, and the theory whose risk he’s 
interested in assessing is one that allows the formation of 
the category of all structures of a given kind, e.g., the 
category … of all groups, … of all topological space[s], … of all 
categories.  (Feferman [2013], p. 9) 
 
In other words, not just, for example, the category of ‘enough groups’ 
(as Burgess puts it) for some practical purpose, but the category of 
all groups.  These  
unrestricted notions … are mathematically reasonable on the face 
of it and do not obviously lead to paradoxical conclusions.27  
(Ibid.) 
 
The challenge, then, is to combine them with all the usual objects and 
operations that category theorists call upon in the course of their 
mathematical work, and to prove the resulting theory consistent 
relative to ‘a currently accepted system of set theory’ (ibid.).   
 Despite incremental partial successes from Feferman, McLarty and 
others over the years, this problem remained open until just recently.  
In his [2015], Ernst shows that any theory that allows the formation 
of the category of all graphs and that includes the required 
                       
26  Feferman ([1977], p. 155) characterizes the deficit of the Grothendieck-
style reduction as ‘aesthetic’, but it’s hard to see why a foundational use 
has to be beautiful in some way or other. 
 
27  It might appear that a paradox is ready to hand:  the category of 
categories is a category; the category of groups isn’t a group; what about 
the category of all non-self-membered categories?  The trouble with this 
tempting line of thought is that ‘membership’ isn’t native to the world of 
naïve category theory.  We could define what it is for the category of 
categories to be ‘self-membered’:  it’s for the category of categories to be 
a category.  Likewise the category of groups is ‘non-self-membered’ because 
it’s not a group.  But categories in general aren’t given in the form ‘the 
category of all X’s’, so a general membership relation can’t be defined in 
this way.  As Feferman ([2013], p. 9) remarks, ‘There is no sensible way … to 
form a category of all categories which do not belong to themselves’. 
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mathematical staples is in fact inconsistent.28  So regardless of 
whether Mac Lane’s demand that set theory provide for unlimited 
categories is based on Metaphysical Insight or on another motive, it’s 
a demand that can’t be met -- not because of any shortcoming on set 
theory’s part, but because the objects he demands are themselves 
inconsistent, beyond the reach of any consistent foundation.   
 Nevertheless, as a historical matter, many calls to replace set-
theoretic foundations with category-theoretic foundations arose from 
the ill-fated hope that category theory, unlike set theory, could meet 
this impossible demand: 
One might hope for some … new foundational system (the category 
of categories?) within which all the desired objects live.  (Mac 
Lane [1971], p. 236) 
 
Though Lawvere (in [1966]) takes exactly this thought as his title -- 
‘The category of categories as a foundation for mathematics’ -- his 
primary focus is actually on a foundational use distinct from those 
considered so far.  But before we turn to this new sense of 
‘foundation’, we need to ask how this theory of categories, or really 
an improved descendant due to McLarty [1991],29 fares on the various, 
more familiar foundational uses that set theory has been seen to 
underwrite.   
                       
28  The proof is non-trivial, structured roughly along the lines of a proof 
that there is no set of all sets via Cantor’s theorem:  Ernst assumes there 
is a category of all graphs R (actually reflexive graphs, but the result 
generalizes to all graphs), concocts a certain exponential, shows there can’t 
be a map of R onto this exponential, then uses the fact that the exponential 
is a substructure of R to show that there is a map of R onto the exponential. 
 
 
29  The system of McLarty [1991] avoids the shortcomings identified in 
Isbell’s [1967] review of Lawvere [1966]. 
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 The Category of Categories as a Foundation (CCAF) begins from a 
simple axiomatic theory that codifies the usual category-theoretic 
machinery to yield  
the usual results of general category theory … as hypotheticals 
of the form ‘If A is a cartesian closed category, then … ‘ or ‘If 
A is a non-trivial topos, then … ‘.  … On the other hand, the 
axioms prove the existence of few specific cases of these general 
results.  (McLarty [1991], pp. 1258-1259) 
 
This minimal background theory is then supplemented ‘with axioms on 
particular categories or functors’ (ibid.), depending on the intended 
use.  For foundational purposes, one adds the axioms of the Elementary 
Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS) -- also introduced by Lawvere 
(in his [1964]) -- which characterize a weak set theory (equivalent to 
ZC with bounded separation).  Mathias [2001] describes various 
shortfalls of ETCS, mostly the failure of iterative constructions, but 
these can be achieved by adding a category-theoretic version of 
Replacement to generate a system equivalent to ZFC, and large cardinal 
axioms to duplicate the full force of ZFC + LCs.30 
 If the foundational uses are to be recovered in this way, 
opponents might argue that ZFC + LCs is doing the true foundational 
work, and this Augmented-ETCS is just piggy-backing,31 but both Mac 
Lane and McLarty argue that ETCS is itself an independent, thoroughly 
category-theoretic system: 
                       
30  See McLarty [2004] for these extensions of ETCS.  As Ernst [201?] points 
out, this augmentation is often resisted by advocates of category-theoretic 
foundations, because the mathematics it’s designed to accommodate is regarded 
as expendable.  This would be a new use of a foundation -- as a way of 
pruning mathematics! -- directly opposed to the thought behind MAXIMIZE (see 
footnote 15).   
 
31  Indeed they have so argued.  See, e.g., Hellman [2003]. 
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The standard ‘foundation’ for Mathematics start[s] with sets and 
their elements.  It is possible to start differently, by 
axiomatizing not elements of sets but functions between sets.[32]  
This can be done using the language of categories and universal 
constructions.  (Mac Lane [1986], p. 398) 
 
ETCS is a set theory.  It is not a membership-based set theory 
like ZF.  It is a function-based set theory.  Mac Lane generally 
uses the phrase ‘set theory’ to mean ZF, a habit of more than 
thirty years before ETCS was conceived.  But we cannot let his 
terminology misdirect us.  He is explicit that ETCS is his 
preferred account of sets.  (McLarty [2004], p. 39) 
 
The thought is that ZF-style set theory doesn’t enjoy exclusive rights 
to the pre-theoretic notion of ‘collection’.  We’re to imagine 
ourselves starting from scratch, thinking purely category-
theoretically, and devising a theory of collections in top-down 
function-based terms, rather than bottom-up element-based terms.  
 I should note that this particular objection to category-
theoretic foundations is part of a broader concern about category 
theory’s ‘autonomy’, beginning in Feferman [1977].33  Linnebo and 
Pettigrew [2011] summarize the complaints under three headings:  
logical autonomy -- can the theory be stated without appeal to set 
theory?, conceptual autonomy -- can the theory be understood without a 
prior understanding of set theory?, and justificatory autonomy -- can 
the theory be justified without appealing to set theory and/or its 
justifications?  Though I make no claim to have grasped all the ins 
and outs of this debate, it seems clear that both ZFC + LCs and 
Augmented-CCAF (= CCAF + Augmented-ETCS) are straightforward first-
order theories, each inspired by a range of intuitive, proto-
                       
32  See von Neumann [1925]. 
33  The literature on this topic is copious and tangled.  See Ernst [201?] for 
a recent overview.   
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mathematical notions:  for set theory, these include collection, 
membership, iteration and a combinatorial idea of ‘all possible 
subsets’ as described, for example, by Bernays34; for category theory, 
perhaps collection, function, composition of functions, … .35  As long 
as ‘collection’ isn’t awarded exclusively to set theory by some kind 
of natural right, the two appear to be equally autonomous.   
As for justificatory autonomy, Linnebo and Pettigrew propose that 
the iterative conception justifies ZFC, and argue that the category 
theorist is unable to come up with anything sufficiently comparable.  
My own view is that the iterative conception is a brilliant heuristic 
device, but that the justification for the axioms it suggests (and 
even for potential axioms it doesn’t suggest!) rests on their power to 
further various mathematical goals of set theory, including its 
foundational goals.36  This mode of justification (which Linnebo and 
Pettigrew don’t consider) is open to category theory as well, and 
granting the dramatic success of category-theoretic methods in various 
areas of mathematics, there can be little doubt that its concepts and 
techniques are well-justified.  So, for what it’s worth, I see no 
threat to the autonomy of category theory in these justificatory 
pathways.  What we’ve been asking here, in this exploration of 
                       
34  Bernays [1934].  See also [1997], pp. 127-128. 
 
35  It might be of interest to investigate more carefully which intuitive 
notions each theory appeals to and which it explicates, and where these lists 
differ, to examine how successfully each explicates the other’s primitives.  
For example:  ZFC-style set theory explicates ‘function’ with the much-
maligned set of ordered pairs; Mathias derides the category-theoretic 
treatment of ‘iteration’ as ‘clumsy’ (Mathias [2001], p. 227). 
   
36  See [1997], [2011].   
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category theory’s foundational aspirations, is whether the axioms of 
Augmented-CCAF are (partly) justified by their effectiveness toward 
the foundational goals, but our question is whether there is such a 
justification at all, not whether it’s parasitic on set theory.   
  Returning to our main theme, then:  how are the foundational uses 
of set theory recovered in this category-theoretic context, in 
Augmented-CCAF?  As an example, McLarty takes up the construction of 
reals as Dedekind cuts, concluding that  
once you get beyond axiomatic basics, to the level of set theory 
that mathematicians normally use, ZF and ETCS [ETCS plus 
Replacement?] are not merely intertranslatable.  They work just 
alike.  (McLarty [2004], p. 41) 
 
So it seems Elucidation works much as before:  a surrogate is found in 
ETCS rather than ZF, and the clarificatory benefits are pretty much 
the same.  Presumably Risk Assessment makes use of the large cardinals 
of Augmented-ETCS in the familiar ways.37   
I’m less sure how to think about Meta-mathematical Corral, 
Generous Arena, and Shared Standard.  On the category theorist’s 
foundational scheme, what do we say to the mathematician who wants to 
know whether or not there’s a definable well-ordering of the reals?  
What theory do we turn to if we want to formulate questions of what 
can or can’t be proved in ‘classical mathematics’, or to determine 
conclusively whether or not a purported informal proof is legitimate?  
All the reduced items appear side-by-side, and theorems about them are 
provable, in the category satisfying Augmented-ETCS, which suggests 
Augmented-ETCS as a likely candidate for Generous Arena and the rest, 
                       
37  One reason, perhaps, to resist the pruning in footnote 30. 
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but the fact that CCAF posits items outside that category casts doubt 
on this move.  Perhaps Augmented-CCAF itself, then?   
Surprisingly, this line of thought is undercut by passages where 
Mac Lane appears to deny the very desirability of Generous Arena in 
the first place, preferring a Hilbert-like approach to a von-Staudt-
style construction in the case of the reals:   
This careful construction of the real numbers was long accepted 
as standard in graduate education in mathematics, even though 
many mathematicians did not much believe in it.  …  This 
viewpoint can be expressed … formally:  Do not construct the 
reals, but describe them axiomatically as an ordered field, 
complete in the sense that every bounded set has a least upper 
bound.  (Mac Lane [1981], p. 467) 
 
Let’s leave this unsettling thought aside for the moment and look 
first at the new foundational use that Lawvere and others see as 
deciding the case in favor of category theory over set theory.   
It first appears as an objection to set-theoretic foundations: 
This Grand Set Theoretic Foundation … does not adequately 
describe which are the relevant mathematical structures to be 
built up from the starting point of set theory.  A priori from 
set theory there could be very many such structures, but in fact 
there are a few which are dominant … natural numbers, rational 
numbers, real numbers … group, ring, order and partial order … .  
The ‘Grand Foundation’ does not provide any way in which to 
explain the choice of these concepts.  (Mac Lane [1981], p. 468) 
 
While set theory has the wherewithal to build all the mathematically 
important structures, its construction techniques are indiscriminate, 
generating a vast store of mathematically useless structures along the 
way and providing no guidance as to which are which.  There’s also 
some discomfort about the way in which those structures are built up: 
In the mathematical development of recent decades ones sees 
clearly the rise of the conviction that the relevant properties 
of mathematical objects are those which can be stated in terms of 
their abstract structure rather than in terms of the elements 
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which the objects were thought to be made of.  (Lawvere [1966], 
p. 1) 
 
Set-theoretic constructions introduce a lot of irrelevant structure:  
for example, a Dedekind cut is a set of rationals, which are 
equivalence classes of sets of pairs of natural numbers, which are 
ordinals, and so on, but none of this detail has any direct connection 
to their intended behavior as surrogates for the reals, as the 
availability of alternatives like Cauchy sequences serves to 
demonstrate.    
 Complaints like these about set-theoretic foundations led to the 
suggestion that category theory might be better suited to the task.  
Lawvere hopes for a foundation that will bring ‘abstract structure’ to 
the forefront: 
The question thus naturally arises whether one can give a 
foundation for mathematics which expresses wholeheartedly this 
conviction concerning what mathematics is about, and in 
particular, in which classes and membership in classes do not 
play any role. (Lawvere [1966], p. 1) 
 
Mac Lane stresses the replacement of static elements with dynamic 
functions: 
There are other possibilities.  For example, the membership 
relation for sets can often be replaced by the composition 
operation for functions.  This leads to an alternative foundation 
for Mathematics upon categories … much of Mathematics is dynamic, 
in that it deals with morphisms of an object L into another 
object of the same kind.  Such morphisms … form categories, and 
so the approach via categories fits well with the objective of 
organizing and understanding Mathematics.  (Mac Lane [1986], p. 
359) 
 
McLarty emphasizes that this particular foundational use should 
reflect what mathematicians actually do in their mathematical lives:    
Mac Lane had a different idea of foundations …  He took a 
foundation of mathematics to be a body of truths which organize 
mathematics as do I here.  More specifically, that is truths 
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which actually serve in practice to define the concepts of 
mathematics and prove the theorems.  I do not mean merely truths 
which could in some principled sense possibly organize the 
practice but truths actually used in textbooks and journal 
articles, and discussed in seminar rooms and over beer, so their 
notions do occur in practice.  (McLarty [2013], p. 80) 
 
The goal here is a foundation for mathematics that will capture the 
fundamental character of mathematics as it’s actually done, that will 
guide mathematicians toward the truly important concepts and 
structures, without getting bogged down in irrelevant details.  I 
propose Essential Guidance as an awkward label for this foundational 
goal, hoping to highlight its two aspects:  such a foundation is to 
reveal the fundamental features -- the essence, in practice -- of the 
mathematics being founded, without irrelevant distractions; and it’s 
to guide the progress of mathematics along the lines of those 
fundamental features and away from false alleyways.38 
 Of course, Lawvere, Mac Lane and McLarty are entirely correct 
when they point out that set theory does not provide Essential 
Guidance.39  For the record, though, we should note that this fact in 
no way compromises its other foundations uses:  the lack of guidance 
and the presence of extraneous details don’t undercut Meta-
mathematical Corral, Elucidation, Risk Assessment, Generous Arena, or 
                       
38  It may be that this is the use Voevodsky has in mind for ‘univalent 
foundations’:  ‘The languages which arise in this approach are much more 
convenient for doing serious mathematics than ZFC’ (Voevodsky [2014], p. 
108). 
 
39  Presumably, neither does ETCS.  I take it ETCS and its extensions are to 
be called upon for some foundational jobs, like Elucidation and Risk 
Assessment, while something broader, like Augmented-CCAF, is to provide 
Essential Guidance. 
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Shared Standard.40  They do, however, keep set theory from providing 
Metaphysical Insight; that’s the moral of Benacerraf and the rest.  As 
floated in passing earlier, could it be that something like this is 
part of what’s at issue for some of these category-theoretic thinkers, 
some hope of uncovering the true nature of the mathematical 
structures?  However that may be, it does seem likely that a version 
of Epistemic Source is implicit in the kind of guidance they have in 
mind:  our ‘understanding’ of the mathematics is presumably based in 
our grasp of its fundamental concepts and techniques.  In any case, I 
don’t see that anything like Essential Guidance was among the 
ambitions of set-theoretic foundations in the first place, so to count 
them as ‘failures’ of set theory is to fault a cat for not being a 
dog.  But if a category-theoretic foundation does deliver on this 
desideratum, it would enjoy a dramatic advantage over set theory. 
 Alas, it isn’t clear that category theory does deliver on 
Essential Guidance.  I think it’s agreed on all sides that a category-
theoretic conceptual framework is a remarkably effective way of 
thinking in fields like algebraic topology and algebraic geometry -- 
no one would suggest that specialists in these areas would do better 
to think more like set theorists.  The contested claim -- if category-
theoretic foundations are to capture what’s most fundamental, to guide 
us to the mathematically significant concepts -- is that all 
mathematicians would do better to think like category theorists.  But 
even Mac Lane, in his sober moments, doesn’t believe this: 
                       
40  Cf. Mathias [1992], p. 115:  ‘to reject a claim that set theory supplies a 
universal mode of mathematical thought … need not compel one to declare set 
theory is entirely valueless’. 
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Categories and functors are everywhere in topology and in parts 
of algebra, but they do not yet relate very well to most of 
analysis.  (Mac Lane [1986], p. 407) 
 
Analysis is where set theory first arose, much as category theory 
arose in algebra, so it’s no surprise that set-theoretic thinking is 
more suitable there.   
Mathias, who has done much to bring out the difficulties of 
category theory in analysis,41 gives this reading of Mac Lane’s 
resistance to set theory: 
I would guess that his reason is not so much that he objects to 
the ontology of set theory but that he finds the set-theoretic 
cast of mind oppressive and feels that other models of thought 
are more appropriate to the mathematics he wishes to do.  
(Mathias [1992], p. 115) 
 
But the analyst or set theorist might well feel the same way about the 
category-theoretic cast of mind: 
The CAT camp [who believe category theory has ‘the one true view 
of pure mathematics’] may with justice claim that category theory 
brings out subtleties in geometry to which set theory is blind. … 
The SET camp [who believe set theory has ‘the one true view of 
pure mathematics’] may with equal justice claim that set-
theoretic analysis brings out subtleties to which the CAT camp is 
blind.  (Mathias [2001], pp. 226-227) 
 
It seems that both these camps are chasing a false goal:  a foundation 
that delivers Essential Guidance, a single understanding of what 
mathematics is, a single recommendation on how mathematicians should 
think.42   
                       
41  See Mathias [2000], [2001].  Beyond analysis, Ernst [2014] explores some 
potentially problematic examples from graph theory. 
 
42  Mathias himself advocates ‘unity’, akin to Generous Arena (see below), but 
not ‘uniformity’, or Essential Guidance:  ‘Is it desirable to press 
mathematicians all to think in the same way?  I say not:  if you take someone 
who wishes to become a set theorist and force him to do (say) algebraic 
topology, what you get is not a topologist but a neurotic’ (Mathias [1992], 
p. 113). 
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 Now the odd thing is that Mac Lane would apparently agree: 
We conclude that there is as yet no simple and adequate way of 
conceptually organizing all of Mathematics.  (Mac Lane [1986], p. 
407) 
 
In other words, no foundation, not even a category-theoretic 
foundation, has a corner on Essential Guidance.  Yet we’ve seen that 
he champions category-theoretic foundations over set-theoretic 
foundations because its approach ‘fits well with the objective of 
organizing and understanding Mathematics’ (Mac Lane [1986], p. 359).  
Perhaps this apparent conflict actually dovetails with the suggestion 
above that Mac Lane might reject some of the foundational desiderata 
that set theory successfully satisfies, for example, Generous Arena.  
If we deny the importance of bringing (surrogates for) all 
mathematical structures into a shared context where they can be 
compared side-by-side, their interrelations revealed, methods and 
results imported and exported, and so on, then the Hilbert-style 
approach of leaving the axiom system for each mathematical structure 
to stand separately, on its own, might seem preferable to the von-
Staudt-style construction.  The need for a single foundational scheme 
would be disappear, and the possibility of a range of schemes might 
seem attractive:  ‘the variety of proposals for organizations reflects 
the diversity and richness of Mathematics’ (Mac Lane [1986], p. 407). 
 If this is right, then Mac Lane’s ultimate point is more radical 
than the simple claim that category theory is a better foundation for 
mathematics than set theory.  His point, rather, is that the most 
important function of a foundation is Essential Guidance, and if this 
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conflicts with some of the traditional foundational uses set theory 
has been put to, like Generous Arena, then so much the worse for those 
traditional uses.  I’ve tried to sketch how set theory came to be seen 
as the Generous Arena, why this was thought to be important, what work 
it did, and so on.  Burgess [2015] gives a more extended review of the 
history; Mathias gives a mathematician’s eye view: 
One of the remarkable things about mathematics is that I can 
formulate a problem, be unable to solve it, pass it to you; you 
solve it; and then I can make use of your solution.  There is a 
unity here:  we benefit from each other’s efforts. … But if I 
pause to ask why you have succeeded where I have failed … I find 
myself faced with the baffling fact that you have thought of the 
problem in a very different way from me:  and if I look around 
the whole spectrum of mathematical activity the huge variety of 
styles of thought becomes even more evident. … The purpose of 
foundational work in mathematics is to promote the unity of 
mathematics; the larger hope is to establish an ontology within 
which all can work in their different ways. (Mathias [1992], pp. 
113-114) 
 
I leave it to the reader’s conscience to decide whether Generous 
Arena, and possibly other of the traditional foundational uses, should 
be jettisoned.   
Perhaps the best course would to stop quibbling about the word 
‘foundation’, leave set theory to the important functions it so ably 
performs, and turn serious philosophical and methodological attention 
to the matter of distinguishing and exploring the distinctive ‘ways of 
thinking’ that flourish in different areas of pure mathematics.  
Directly after his claim that category theory ‘fits well with the 
objective of organizing and understanding Mathematics’, Mac Lane 
continues, ‘That, in truth, should be the goal of a proper philosophy 
of Mathematics’ (Mac Lane [1986], p. 359, emphasis added).  Perhaps 
the unremarked shift from ‘foundation of Mathematics’ to ‘philosophy 
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of Mathematics’ is telling; perhaps what Mac Lane is really after 
isn’t so much a replacement for set theory as a broader appreciation 
for, and more philosophical/methodological attention to, the 
organizational and expressive powers of category theory.  I think we 
can all agree that this would be a good thing!   
 
III.  The multiverse  
 
The most recent challenge to straightforward set-theoretic 
foundations in V comes, oddly enough, from among set theorists 
themselves.  To quote yet another textbook: 
Should we suppose that the continuum hypothesis, for example, has 
a definite truth value in a well-defined canonical model?  Or is 
there a range of models in which the truth value of the continuum 
hypothesis varies, none of which has any special ontological 
priority?  Forcing tends to push us in the latter direction.  
(Weaver [2014], p. 118) 
 
Hamkins, whose position Weaver endorses, describes the situation this 
way: 
Our most powerful set-theoretic tools, such as forcing, 
ultrapowers, and canonical inner models, are most naturally and 
directly understood as methods of constructing alternative set-
theoretic universes.  A large part of set theory over the past 
half-century has been about constructing as many different models 
of set theory as possible …  As a result, the fundamental objects 
of study in set theory have become the models of set theory, and 
set theorists move with agility from one model to another. … Set 
theory appears to have discovered an entire cosmos of set-
theoretic universes.  (Hamkins [2012], p. 418) 
 
This has come to be called a ‘multiverse’ view.  Woodin observes of 
one such position that 
the refinements of Cohen’s method of forcing in the decades since 
his initial discovery of the method and the resulting plethora of 
problems shown to be unsolvable, have in a practical sense almost 
compelled one to adopt the generic-multiverse position.  (Woodin 
[2011], pp. 16-17) 
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If this is right, our fundamental theory shouldn’t be a theory of 
sets, but a theory of set-theoretic universes.   
 There are actually several different multiverse proposals 
currently on offer.43  The most generous is Hamkins version: 
The background idea of the multiverse … is that there should be a 
large collection of universes, each a model of (some kind of) set 
theory.  There seems to be no reason to restrict inclusion only 
to ZFC models, as we can include models of weaker theories ZF, 
ZF-, KP, and so on, and perhaps even down to second-order number 
theory, as this is set-theoretic in a sense. … We want to 
consider that the multiverse is as big as we can imagine.  At any 
time, we are living inside one of the universes, referred to as V 
and thought of as the current universe, but by various means, 
sometimes metamathematical, we may be able to move around in the 
multiverse.  (Hamkins [2012], pp. 436-437) 
 
Hamkins is out to explain mathematical experience: 
This abundance of set-theoretic possibilities poses a serious 
difficulty for the universe view … one must explain or explain 
away as imaginary all of the alternative universes that set 
theorists seem to have constructed.  This seems a difficult task, 
for we have a robust experience in those worlds … The multiverse 
view … explains this experience by embracing them as real. 
(Hamkins [2012], p. 418) 
 
Steel and Woodin, in contrast, are concerned with the claim, suggested 
by Weaver above, that CH has no determinate truth value.44   
Steel observes that 
we have good evidence that the consistency hierarchy is not a 
mirage, that the theories in it we have identified are indeed 
consistent.  This is especially true at the lower levels, where 
we already have canonical inner models, and equiconsistencies 
with fragments of definable determinacy.  This argues for 
                       
43  Väänänen [2014] provides a framework that encompasses the positions of 
Hamkins, Steel and Woodin.  S. Friedman sometimes uses multiverse language, 
but it isn’t clear (at least to me) that his is a true multiverse view.  See, 
e.g., Arrigoni and Friedman [2013]. 
 
44  Cf. Woodin [2011], p. 16:  ‘The generic-multiverse position … declares 
that the Continuum Hypothesis is neither true nor false’.  Steel ([2014], p. 
168) takes his approach to open the possibility that CH and the like are 
‘meaningless … pseudo-questions’.  
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developing the theories in this hierarchy.  (Steel [2014], p. 
164) 
 
He then defends the resulting ZFC + LCs on the grounds that it allows 
the set-theoretic reduction: 
The central role of the theories axiomatized by large cardinal 
hypotheses argues for adding such hypotheses to our framework.  
The goal of our framework theory is to maximize interpretive 
power, to provide a language and theory in which all mathematics, 
of today and of the future so far as we can anticipate it today, 
can be developed.  (Ibid., p. 165) 
 
The trouble, of course, is that this strong and attractive theory -- 
ZFC + LCs -- can’t settle statements like CH, as forcing so 
dramatically demonstrates.  Does it follow that CH has a no 
determinate truth value?45  
Woodin addresses this question by formulating what he calls the 
generic multiverse, a collection of models of ZFC + LCs:46    
It is generated from each universe of the collection by closing 
under generic extensions (enlargements) and under generic 
refinements (inner models of a universe which the given universe 
is a generic extension of).  (Woodin [2011], p. 14) 
 
In a slogan:  if N is a forcing extension of M, and one of them is in 
the generic multiverse, then so is the other.  Obviously, he and 
Hamkins differ on the range of the universes in their multiverses -- 
                       
45    Notice the sharp contrast between Hamkins’s goal -- embrace the  
widest possible range of universes -- and Woodin’s and Steel’s shared 
goal -- given what we take ourselves to know about sets (roughly 
ZFC+LCs), figure out whether there a fact of the matter about CH.  
Though both can reasonably be called ‘multiverse’ views, they are 
quite different undertakings, and can’t be evaluated by the same 
standards.  E.g., though Hamkins’s all-inclusive project naturally 
prompts him to include universes in which V=L, it would be 
inappropriate to criticize Woodin and Steel for ruling them out.   
 
46  Actually, both Steel and Woodin begin with models of ZFC, with the 
addition of large cardinals as on option, but context (e.g., the above 
motivation from Steel) suggests they lean toward taking that option.  This is 
irrelevant for the case of CH, which is their primary focus.   
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he and Steel both begin from our current best theory of sets47 -- but 
they also disagree sharply on the relevant notion of truth:  Woodin 
takes a claim to be true in the multiverse iff it holds in every 
universe of the multiverse; Hamkins rejects this notion48 and holds 
that his many universes ‘exhibit diverse set-theoretic truths’ 
(Hamkins [2012], p. 416).   
Woodin goes on to argue (assuming the Ω conjecture) that generic 
multiverse truth amounts to ‘a brand of formalism that denies the 
transfinite’, and hence that ‘the generic-multiverse position … is not 
reasonable’ (Woodin [2011], p. 17). Steel reports that  
Woodin’s paper makes some arguments against the generic universe 
position, based on the logical complexity of certain truth 
predicates, but those arguments do not seem valid to me.  (Steel 
([2014], p. 170; for details, see his footnote 24) 
 
I can only leave this call to the experts.  
 Steel’s own multiverse approach is more syntactic than either 
Hamkins’s or Woodin’s, but before we get to that, let’s pause to 
consider what becomes of set theory’s foundational uses on a model-
theoretic multiverse conception like these.  As noted in §I, I did 
once believe there was a strong prima facia case against a multiverse 
of any kind, based on the assumptions that one of set theory’s leading 
goals is to provide a foundation and that one function of a foundation 
is to serve as a ‘final court of appeal’.  The idea is simple:  if set 
theory is to settle questions of proof and existence, then set 
                       
47  See footnote 45. 
48  Cf. Hamkins [2012], p. 445:  ‘Woodin introduced [the generic multiverse] 
in order to criticize a certain multiverse view of truth, namely, truth as 
true in every model of the generic multiverse. … I do not hold such a view of 
truth’. 
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theorists should strive for a single preferred theory of sets that’s 
as decisive as possible -- so as to produce unequivocal judgments when 
called upon.  Of course this very same set-theoretic goal also 
counsels that set theory be as generous as possible, so as not to 
limit mathematics,49 but at least in the most conspicuous cases of 
potential bifurcation -- like ZFC + LCs vs. ZFC + V=L -- it’s possible 
to avoid an exclusive choice -- because ZFC + V=L can be viewed as the 
theory of L even in a universe with large cardinals.  But this 
innocent observation actually paves the way for the less doctrinaire 
descendants of the ‘final court’ identified in §I, where Shared 
Standard and Generous Arena make room for stronger theories, as long 
as added hypotheses are flagged so that import/export restrictions can 
be observed -- and this begins to sound a bit like a multiverse view.  
So what I once took for an objection becomes a question:  is the 
multiverse intended to continue to play the foundational roles that 
the universe once did, and if so, how does it do this?50    
 Hamkins addresses these questions directly: 
Set theorists commonly take their subject as constituting an 
ontological foundation for the rest of mathematics, in the sense 
that abstract mathematical objects can be construed … as sets.  
(Hamkins [2012], p. 416)   
 
The multiverse view does not abandon the goal of using set theory 
as an epistemological and ontological foundation for mathematics, 
for we expect to find all our familiar mathematical objects … 
inside any one of the universes of the multiverse.  (Ibid., p. 
419) 
 
                       
49  See footnote 15. 
 
50  This is to entertain the possibility that UNIFY, in its original form, 
might not be required for set theory’s foundational uses. 
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The idea is that when we do set theory, ‘we jump inside and explore 
the nature of set theory offered by that universe’ (ibid., p. 417), 
and whenever we do this, all the usual resources of classical 
mathematics will be available.51   
So what happens when our mathematician asks about that definable 
well-ordering of the reals?   
When a mathematical issue is revealed to have a set-theoretic 
dependence … then the multiverse response is a careful 
explanation that the mathematical fact of the matter depends on 
which [universe] is used, and this is almost always a very 
interesting situation, in which one may weigh the desirability of 
various set-theoretic hypotheses with their mathematical 
consequences.  (Hamkins [2012], p. 419) 
 
This sounds very like what I said in the universe voice in §I:  we 
explain to the mathematician that there is no such well-ordering in V, 
but that there is one in L; we lay out the mathematically attractive 
and unattractive features of L; and we caution that if he elects to 
take this route, he will have to be careful about exporting and 
importing resources to and from V.  
 Hamkins admits that avenues like this are available to the 
universe advocate, for outer models as well as inner: 
We do have a measure of access into the forcing extensions via 
names and the forcing relation, allowing us to understand the 
objects and truths of the forcing extension while remaining in 
the ground model.  (Hamkins [2012], p. 419) 
 
So what makes the multiverse approach preferable? 
The multiverse view explains our mathematical experience with 
these models by positing that, indeed, these alternative 
universes exist, just as they seem to exist, with a full 
mathematical existence, fully as real as the universe under the 
universe view.  (Ibid., p. 419) 
                       
51  Here, presumably, the multiverse doesn’t include models of theories too 
weak to do the job, a stipulation in apparent tension with the generosity 
cited a few pages back. 
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The multiverse view … takes … forcing at face-value, as evidence 
that there actually are V-generic filters and the corresponding 
universes V[G] to which they give rise, existing outside the 
universe.  This is a claim  we cannot prove within set theory, of 
course, but the philosophical position makes sense of our 
experience -- in a way that the universe view does not -- simply 
by filling in the gaps, by positing as a philosophical claim the 
actual existence of the generic objects … With forcing, we seem 
to have discovered the existence of other mathematical universes, 
outside our own universe, and the multiverse view asserts that 
yes, indeed, this is the case.  (Ibid., p. 425) 
 
This is high metaphysics!  Let’s set it aside for the moment and 
return to the more tractable question of how Hamkins’ multiverse 
carries out its foundational duties. 
 What we’ve been hearing about so far, over and above the 
reduction itself, is apparently the ‘final court’ descendants, Shared 
Standard and Generous Arena; in practice, these are treated much as 
the universe advocate would, with ZFC as the default Shared Standard 
and V the default Generous Arena, with added hypotheses noted and 
import/export carefully regulated.  Elucidation seems unproblematic, 
as it, too, can be carried out within any universe of the multiverse.52 
For Risk Assessment, presumably we call on a universe with large 
cardinals.  For purposes of Meta-mathematical Corral, given that there 
are many universes outside any given universe, perhaps we’re to turn 
to the theory of the multiverse itself, much as we might turn to 
Augmented-CCAF in the case of category-theoretic foundations.53  But 
this raises a new question:  what is the theory of the multiverse?  
                       
52  Again, assuming a more restricted range of models than Hamkins sometimes 
suggests (see previous footnote). 
53  For that matter, we might wonder whether, e.g., the Generous Arena should 
include the entire multiverse, just as we wondered in the case of Augmented-
ETCS vs. Augmented CCAF. 
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What is the counterpart to Augmented-CCAF or ZFC + LCs?  What 
fundamental theory is to tell us what universes there are, something 
we need to know before any of this can get off the ground? 
Hamkins cautions that we shouldn’t expect a first-order theory in 
the language of set theory, 
since the entire point of the multiverse perspective is that 
there may be other universes outside a give one. (Hamkins [2012], 
p. 436)   
 
Still, he does offer a number of multiverse axioms, such as: 
For any universe V and any forcing notion P in V, there is a 
forcing extension V[G], where G is a V-generic subset of P.  
(Ibid., p. 437) 
 
Obviously there is appeal here to quite technical set-theoretic 
notions, so we need to ask how principles like this one could be 
formulated without a prior, ordinary theory of sets in the background.  
We’ve met with this sort of concern before, in the ‘logical autonomy’ 
objection to category-theoretic foundations, but it seems, if 
anything, more apt here than it was there:  can the theory of the 
multiverse be stated without presupposing a theory of the universe?  
Unless it can, no autonomous alternative is actually on offer. 
Steel feels the force of this concern.  As we’ve seen, his 
initial presentation (quoted above) puts the foundational goal front 
and center: 
The goal of our framework theory is to maximize interpretive 
power, to provide a language and theory in which all mathematics, 
of today and of the future so far as we can anticipate it today, 
can be developed.  (Steel [2014], p. 165) 
 
He particularly recognizes the importance of Shared Standard and 
Generous Arena, and of straightforward import/export: 
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Why not simply develop all the natural theories … ?  Let 1000 
flowers bloom!  … This problem with this … is that we do not want 
everyone to have his own private mathematics.  We want one 
framework theory, to be used by all, so that we can use each 
other’s work.  It is better for all our flowers to bloom in the 
same garden.  (Ibid., p. 164) 
 
For this to work, Steel recognizes the need for an explicit, free-
standing theory of the multiverse.  In a ‘historical note’, he 
remarks: 
Neither Hamkins nor Woodin presented a language and a first-order 
theory in that language, both of which seem necessary for a true 
foundation.  (Steel [2014], p. 170) 
 
He provides this by introducing a multiverse language (ML) that speaks 
of both sets and universes, and a list of axioms in that language (MV) 
that includes assertions like these: 
For any axiom φ of ZFC + LCs, and every world W, φW. 
If W is a world and P in W is a poset, then there is a world of 
the form W[G], where G is P-generic over W.   
 
If U is a world, and U=W[G], where G is P-generic over W, then W 
is a world.  (See Steel [2014], p. 165)54 
 
With the help of some serious mathematics, the theory MV can be 
successfully formalized.55  
Steel then constructs, from any transitive model M of ZFC + LCs, 
a set of worlds MG that form a natural model of MV.56  At this point, 
‘truth in the multiverse MG’ is a perfectly straightforward notion:  a 
                       
54  Woodin and Steel differ, e.g., over Steel’s axiom of Amalgamation ([2014], 
p. 165):  ‘If U and W are worlds, then there are G, H sets generic over them 
such that W[G] = U[H]’. 
 
55  The key step for the last of these is a theorem of Laver and Woodin proved 
in an appendix to Woodin [2011]. 
 
56  Let G be M-generic for Col(ω, <ORM).  Then MG is the collection of all ‘W 
such that W[H] = M[G/α], for some H set generic over W, and some α in ORM’ 
(Steel [2014], p. 166). 
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statement in ML is true or false in MG in a standard model-theoretic 
sense.  But this isn’t the notion Steel is after.  His leading 
question, like Woodin’s, is whether CH, a statement in the pure 
language of set theory (LST), has a determinate truth value, and he 
approaches this question by asking whether CH is or isn’t meaningful.  
(If it’s not meaningful, it’s not even a candidate for truth or 
falsity.)  So the multiverse position Steel considers isn’t the 
Woodin-like proposal that a set-theoretic claim is true in the 
multiverse iff it’s true in every universe of the multiverse, but 
something he calls the Weak Relativist Thesis (WRT).   
To sneak up on the WRT, first notice that since the statement of 
concern, CH, is a statement of LST, and Steel’s (perfectly ordinary) 
multiverse truths are statements of ML, a link between the two 
languages is crucial.  Fortunately, a theorem of Laver and Woodin 
implies that there’s a recursive translation function t from ML to LST 
such that for all φ in ML, MG thinks φ iff M thinks t(φ).57  The 
multiverse idea behind the WRT is that the only meaningful statements 
of set theory are those expressible in ML, so the Thesis says that a 
statement ψ of LST is meaningful iff there’s a φ in ML such that ψ is 
t(φ) -- or more succinctly, iff ψ is in the range of t. 
                       
57  In fact, Steel suggests that we only understand ML via the translation t.  
If so, this raises a question of ‘psychological autonomy’ for MV that runs 
parallel to the case of category theory:  can we understand ML without first 
understanding LST?  Steel recognizes the problem and offers a rebuttal:  
‘This is not a very strong objection, as one could think of what we are doing 
as isolating the meaningful part of the standard language, the range of t, 
while trimming away the meaningless, in order to avoid pseudo-questions.  
After climbing our ladder, we throw it away, and from now on, MV can serve as 
our foundation’ (Steel [2014], p. 168).  This move deserves some scrutiny, 
but that’s a topic for another occasion. 
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So, is CH meaningful?  As a warm-up, consider another statement 
in LST:  ‘there is a measurable cardinal’.  It’s an axiom of MV that 
this holds in every world of the multiverse, but that’s not enough to 
show that it appears in the range of t.  In fact, it doesn’t.  But 
Steel suggests that it’s reasonable to assume that t(for all W, ‘there 
is a measurable cardinal’W ) and ‘there is a measurable cardinal’ are 
synonymous.58  And since ‘for all W, ‘there is a measurable cardinal’W’ 
is true in MG, the synonymous set-theoretic statement ‘there is a 
measurable cardinal’ is both meaningful and true.  So far so good, but 
the same trick won’t work for CH, because ‘for all W, CHW’ won’t 
translate to anything like the LST statement that CH.  If this were 
the end of the story, CH would be meaningless and WRT would yield the 
same conclusion as in Woodin’s multiverse:  CH has no determinate 
truth value; it would be, as Steel puts it, a ‘pseudo-question’ (Steel 
[2014], p. 154).  But this isn’t the end of the story, because, Steel 
notes, there may be ‘traces of CH’ elsewhere in ML, that is, there may 
be statements φ of ML other than ‘for all W, CHW’ such that t(φ) is 
synonymous with CH. 
How could this happen?  Suppose that the multiverse language is 
expressive enough to single out one among its worlds with an explicit 
definition.  Woodin has observed  
that if the multiverse has a definable world, then it has a 
unique definable world, and this world is included in all the 
others.  (Steel [2014], p. 168) 
 
                       
58  This isn’t explicit in the relevant passage on p. 167 of Steel [2014], but 
Steel has confirmed it in correspondence (cited with permission).  He also 
notes a residual concern that the MV statement may involve a refinement of 
the original meaning, but I leave this aside (except for the next footnote). 
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This minimal world, if there is one, is called the core of the 
multiverse.  If the multiverse has a core (C) -- the Weak Absolutist 
Thesis (WAT) -- then it might be reasonable to regard t(CHC) as 
synonymous with CH.59  In that way, CH could turn out to be meaningful 
even on the assumption of WRT, and its truth value would depend on 
what happens in C.  But this is speculative for now; much remains to 
be explored.   
 In sum, then, the multiverse position Steel considers (WRT) would 
take the axiom system MV as fundamental, in the sense that it serves 
to circumscribe our official theory of sets (the range of t).  From 
this perspective, ZFC + LCs (at least) would be both meaningful and 
true, and thus available to play the usual foundational roles in the 
usual ways.  Whether CH has a determinate truth value would remain, 
for now, an open question.   
 So, should we prefer a multiverse foundation to the familiar 
universe foundation?  I think we have to allow that the study of 
multiverse conceptions is in its infancy, so firm conclusions aren’t 
possible at this stage (even if I had the wit to draw them), but I 
would like to register some discomfort over the terms in which the 
debate is often couched.  We witnessed Hamkins’ ontological flight 
above; he proposes that  
each … universe exists independently in the same Platonic sense 
that proponents of the universe view regard their universe to 
exist.  (Hamkins [2014], pp. 416-417) 
                       
59  The residual concern in the previous footnote would arise here as well, 
perhaps even more acutely:  t(CHC) involves a great deal of mathematical 
machinery unknown to many people who presumably do understand CH (like 
Cantor, for instance). 
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Of course, a ‘proponent of the universe view’ might just hold that we 
should pursue one preferred theory of sets, without metaphysical 
addenda,60 but Hamkins, qua proponent of the multiverse view, takes a 
stronger line:  ‘The multiverse view is one of higher-order realism -- 
Platonism about universes’ (ibid.).   
In contrast, Steel’s multiverse position involves no such 
ontology.  Instead, he appeals to meaning:  the multiverse language is 
used (via WRT) as an indicator of which ordinary set-theoretic claims 
are meaningful, capable of truth or falsity, and which are not.  As 
we’ve seen, this raises the possibility that 
the truth value of CH is not determined by the meaning we 
currently assign to the syntax of LST [the language of set 
theory].  (Steel [2014], p. 154) 
 
… and the suggestion (quoted above) that we should  
trim back the current syntax, so that we can stop asking pseudo-
questions.  (Ibid.) 
 
Talk of indeterminacy in ‘the concept’, of diverse ‘concepts of set’, 
is also common in multiverse thinking.  Judging from these 
discussions, it appears that the overarching goal of set-theoretic 
practice is to get these things right, to determine the true Platonic 
ontology, the true contours of the meaning of the word ‘set’, or the 
true nature of ‘the concept of set’. 
 But beneath the rhetoric, it emerges that this way of framing the 
question can’t be quite right.  For example, Hamkins admits that  
we may prefer some of the universes in the multiverse to others, 
and there is no obligation to consider them all as somehow equal 
… we may simply be more interested in parts of the multiverse 
                       
60  See footnote 14. 
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consisting of universes satisfying very strong theories, such as 
ZFC plus large cardinals.  (Hamkins [2012], pp. 417, 436) 
 
For that matter, it’s even possible that we might have good 
mathematical reasons to seek out just one of the universes, just one 
extension of ZFC, as our unique preferred theory.  As far as meanings 
and concepts go, I personally doubt there’s a fact of the matter about 
what is or isn’t part of the current meaning/concept of set, but even 
if there were, and even if it didn’t settle CH, we’d be perfectly free 
to decide that there’s good reason to move on to an enhanced 
meaning/concept that does.  Much like Hamkins, Steel admits this 
possibility: 
Certainly we do not want to employ a syntax which encourages us 
to ask pseudo-questions, and the problem then becomes how to 
flesh out our current meaning, or trim back the current syntax, 
so that we can stop asking pseudo-questions.  (Steel [2014], p. 
154, emphasis added) 
 
So the metaphysics of abstracta or meanings or concepts are all really 
beside the point.  The fundamental challenge these multiverse 
positions raise for the universe advocate is this:  are there good 
reasons to pursue a single, preferred theory of sets that’s as 
decisive as possible, or are there not?   
 Now Steel laments that with matters of justification or ‘good 
reasons’, the ‘general philosophical questions concerning the nature 
of  … evidence … rear their ugly heads’ (Steel [2014], p. 154), but I 
don’t think matters are so dire.  I would argue61 that the relevant 
reasons are all of a type Steel knows well:  straightforwardly 
mathematical reasons.  What mathematical jobs do we want our theory of 
                       
61  Have argued, in [1997] and [2011]. 
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sets to do?  One answer is that we want it to serve the various 
foundational roles of §I, but there are many others:  Cantor was after 
a theory of trigonometric series; Dedekind sought representation-free 
definitions; contemporary set theorists hope for a rich theory of sets 
of reals; and so on.  The choice between a universe approach and a 
multiverse approach is justified to the extent that it facilitates our 
set-theoretic goals.  The universe advocate finds good reasons for his 
view in the many jobs it does so well, at which point the challenge is 
turned back to the multiverse advocate:  given that we could work with 
inner models and forcing extensions from within the simple confines of 
V, as described by our best universe theory, what mathematical 
motivation is there to move to a more complex multiverse theory?   
Hamkins gestures toward this perspective on the question in his 
appendix: 
The mathematician’s measure of a philosophical position may be 
the value of the mathematics to which it leads.  (Hamkins [2012], 
p. 440) 
 
He goes on to describe a pair of research projects inspired by the 
multiverse perspective.  I’m in no position to evaluate the 
mathematics; my question is whether multiverse thinking is playing 
more than a heuristic role, whether there’s anything here that 
couldn’t be carried out in our single official theory of sets.  If 
not, then it’s not clear these examples give us good reason to incur 
the added burden of devising and adopting an official multiverse 
theory as our preferred foundational framework.  Presumably this same 
measure could be applied to Woodin’s generic multiverse:  unless 
there’s at least some hint that it enjoys mathematical advantages over 
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the universe approach, we needn’t even concern ourselves about the 
complexity of its truth predicate.   
 For the supporter of Steel’s WRT, the purported advantage of a 
multiverse foundation appears to be that it saves us from the 
misguided pursuit of pseudo-questions, from doomed efforts to settle 
matters that are indeterminate.62  If the central goal of set theory is 
to identify the features of ‘the meaning we currently assign to the 
syntax’ of set-theoretic language, and if the range of t marks the 
outer limit of that meaning, and if no ‘trace of CH’ is hidden in the 
ML, then efforts to settle CH would be hopeless, inevitably sterile, 
and the multiverse rejection of CH as a legitimate question might be a 
valuable outcome.  Of course a universe advocate, convinced, say, that 
ZFC + LCs marks the outer limit of what we’ll ever know about V, could 
reach the same goal of deterring work on CH by epistemological means, 
without recourse to multiverse thinking.  But more to the point, there 
remains the live possibility that the pursuit of CH isn’t in fact 
doomed.  There might even be what Hamkins calls a ‘dream solution’:  a 
single new axiom that settles CH.63  Of an even more ambitious dream, 
Woodin writes:   
I am an optimist … There is in my view no reason at all, beyond a 
lack of faith, for believing that there is no extension of the 
axioms of ZFC, by one axiom, a posteriori true, which settles all 
                       
62  A defender of Woodin’s multiverse might also argue that it saves us from 
doomed efforts, though Woodin himself -- certainly no defender! -- doesn’t 
say this. 
 
63  Hamkins ([2012], pp. 429-230) argues that a dream solution to CH is 
impossible, but he requires that the axiom in question be ‘obviously true’ in 
place of Woodin’s ‘a posteriori true’ in the following quotation.  (I take ‘a 
posteriori’ here to mean that the justification is extrinsic rather than 
intrinsic.) 
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the instances of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis.  (Woodin 
[2011], p. 30) 
 
Indeed, Steel himself sketches a scenario that could lead even a 
tentative proponent of WRT back to a strengthened universe theory that 
‘fleshes out’ the current meaning to something that settles CH in the 
positive.64  So I don’t see that there’s call to throw over our 
universe foundation in favor of a multiverse quite yet! 
 
IV.  Inconclusive conclusion 
 We’ve seen that set theory, largely via the well-known set-
theoretic reduction, serves a number of valuable mathematical ends 
that ought to qualify as ‘foundational’:  in the current form of ZFC + 
LCs, it provides a simple first-order theory that interprets all of 
classical mathematics, so as to allow for meta-mathematical 
consideration of the whole expanse of that vast subject at once (Meta-
mathematical Corral); it provides the conceptual resources and 
construction techniques to clarify old mathematical notions in order 
to take on new demands (Elucidation); in the hierarchy of large 
cardinals, it provides a flexible scale of consistency strength (Risk 
Assessment); it serves as a benchmark of mathematical proof (Shared 
Standard) and a framework in which the various branches of mathematics 
appear side-by-side, so that results, methods and resources can be 
pooled (Generous Arena).  On the other hand, it doesn’t tell us 
anything about the underlying nature of mathematical objects 
                       
64  See Steel [2014], section 7.  In this way, WRT -- the assumption that our 
current meaning is limited to the ML -- could ultimately point the way to a 
mathematically attractive extension of the current meaning. 
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(Metaphysical Insight) or of mathematical knowledge (Epistemic 
Source).   
Criticisms of this set-theoretic foundation from category 
theorists may falsely assume that it aspires to Metaphysical Insight, 
but however that may be, they explicitly demand that it found a theory 
that can’t in fact be founded (unlimited categories).  Advocates of a 
category-theoretic replacement for set-theoretic foundations appeal to 
the category of sets for Elucidation and presumably for Risk 
Assessment, but the intended execution of the other traditional 
foundational roles is less clear, and the attractions of Generous 
Arena may even been rejected.  Their central hope is for a foundation 
that provides a range of concepts and methods that capture and guide 
the productive ways of thinking that mathematicians actually do and 
should employ (Essential Guidance) -- a role set theory was never 
designed to play.  Proponents are surprisingly unconcerned that 
category theory doesn’t appear equipped to play this role for all 
areas of mathematics, another indication that Generous Arena may have 
fallen away; different foundations might serve for different branches 
of the subject.  My suggestion is that we do best to retain set theory 
in the foundational roles is plays so well, retain Generous Arena in 
particular, but also pursue a serious philosophical/methodological 
investigation of the various ‘ways of thinking’ in mathematics, 
beginning with the contrast between those whose ‘essence’ is well-
captured by category theory or by set theory. 
Another challenge to ZFC-style set theory in its familiar 
foundational role comes from the advocates of a multiverse conception 
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of the subject.  Steel in particular offers an explicit, free-standing 
multiverse theory, MV, as fundamental -- in place of a theory in the 
language of set theory.  With the multiverse assumption WRT, MV 
ratifies a sublanguage of LST that includes ZFC + LCs (more or less by 
fiat), though perhaps not the meaningfulness of CH.  On this picture, 
the theory ZFC + LCs continues in its usual foundational uses, but 
only at the behest of MV, and the prospects for extending it are 
limited.  Faced with the charge that this approach shuts down free 
inquiry into extensions of ZFC + LCs prematurely, an advocate might 
respond that the multiverse investigation has revealed this inquiry to 
be misguided, because the meaning or concept of ‘set’ is simply 
indeterminate beyond certain limits.  Still, even if it’s true that 
our current meaning or concept is indeterminate in this way, there 
remains the possibility that it might be more mathematically 
productive, not to give up the quest for an answer to CH, but to seek 
out a fruitful successor to our current meaning or concept -- a 
possibility that Steel himself clearly acknowledges and pursues.  So 
far at least, the grounds for replacing the universe with a multiverse 
are inconclusive. 
In sum, then, it seems to me that the familiar set-theoretic 
foundations, rough and ready as they are, remain the best tool we have 
for the various important foundational jobs we want done.65 
Penelope Maddy 
                       
65  I’m grateful to Michael Ernst, for his [2014], [2015], [201?], and many 
enjoyable conversations on the aspirations of category-theoretic foundations, 
and to John Steel, for his patience with my questions and confusions about 
his views.  My admiration for John Burgess’s [2015] should be obvious.  
Thanks also to Ernst, Steel, David Malament, Colin McLarty, and an anonymous 
referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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